Washington naval agreement on capital ships

A LEAGUE of NATIONS

Vol. IV, No. 5 October. 1921

Washington Agreement on
Capital Ships

Disarmament on the
Great Lakes

Unfortified Frontiers

Published Bimonthly by the

WORLD PEACE FOUNDATION

40 Mt. Vernon Street, Boston
Price, 5 cents per copy; 25 cents per year

Worlb f

Snalnn,
•FOUNDED IN 1910 BY EDWIN GINN

The corporation is constituted for the purpose of educating the people
of all nations to a full knowledge of the waste and destructi veness of war,
its evil effects on present social conditions and on the well-being of future
generations, and to promote international justice and the brotherhood
of man; and, generally, by every practical means to promote peace
and good will among all mankind. — By-laws of the Corporation.
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the college, the church, the press, the pamphlet and the book, that the
World Peace Foundation addresses itself. — Edwin Ginn.

The idea of force can not at once be eradicated. It is useless to believe
that the nations can be persuaded to disband their present armies and
dismantle their present navies, trusting in each other or in the Hague
Tribunal to settle any possible differences between them, unless, first,
some substitute for the existing forces is provided and demonstrated
by experience to be adequate to protect the rights, dignity and territory
of the respective nations. My own belief is that the idea which underlies
the movement for the Hague Court can be developed so that the nations
can be persuaded each to contribute a small percentage of their military
forces at sea and on land to form an International Guard or Police Force. —
Edwin Ginn.

"Incorporated under the laws of Massachusetts, July 12, 1910, aa the InternatioBal ScbocW
cf Peace. Name changed to World Peace Foundation, December 22, 1910.

A LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Published Bimonthly by

WORLD PEACE FOUNDATION
46 MT. VERNON STREET, BOSTON, MASS.

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CONTENTS

PAGE

I. WASHINGTON NAVAL AGREEMENT ON CAPITAL SHIPS 873

1. Address of Secretary of State Hughes 373

Previous effort reviewed 374

Extraordinary opportunity presented 376

End it now is way out 877

Four principles and their application 379

Capital Ships 379

United States 379

Great Britain 380

Japan 380

Replacement 381

fc. Proposal of the United States for a Limitation of Naval Armament 382

Proposal "For a limitation of Naval Armament" 383

Capital Ships 383

United States 383

Great Britain 383

Japan 383

France and Italy 884

Other new construction 884

List of capital sh ips 885

Disposition of old and new construction S8fi

Replacements 386

Auxiliary combatant craft 887

(a) Auxiliary surface combatant craft 387

Limitation of new construction 387

Scrapping of old construction 388

(6) Submarines 388

Limitation of new construction 388

Scrapping of old construction 388

(r) Airplane carriers and aircraft 388

Limitation of new construction ...... 389

Airplane carriers 389

Scrapping of old construction 389

Auxiliary combatant craft 889

Replacements 389

CONTENTS

PAGE

Aircraft 390

General restriction on transfer of combatant vessels of all

classes 390

Merchant Marine 390

3. Agreement Reached by Subcommittee on Naval Armament,

December 15, 1921 390

II. DISARMAMENT ON THE GREAT LAKES 394

The argument that started it 395

How they compared notes 397

Statement of His Majesty's naval force on the Lakes of Canada

September 1, 1816 398

Statement of the American naval forces 399

Agreement proclaimed 399

How it might not have been done 401

Armament vs. prosperity 402

III. ARGENTINA AND CHILE, 1902 401

Argentina's initiative 405

Declarations of policy 406

Grave fears as to armament 407

"No naval superiority" 409

Decide against increase 411

Legislative opposition 414

An explanation explained 416

The balancing of the fleets 417

IV. UNFORTIFIED FRONTIERS 420

Anglo-Chinese engagement 420

Provision respecting Mekong 420

Neutral Scandinavian zone 421

Aaland Islands neutralized .... 421

I. WASHINGTON NAVAL AGREEMENT
ON CAPITAL SHIPS

1. ADDRESS OF SECRETARY OF STATE HUGHES

GENTLEMEN: It is with a deep sense of privilege and respon-
sibility that I accept the honor [permanent chairmanship] you
have conferred.

Permit me to express the most cordial appreciation of the assur-
ances of friendly co-operation, which have been generously ex-
pressed by the representatives of all the invited Governments.
The earnest desire and purpose, manifested in every step in the
approach to this meeting, that we should meet the reasonable
expectation of a watching world by effective action suited to the
opportunity is the best augury for the success of the Conference.

The President invited the Governments of the British Empire,
France, Italy and Japan to participate in a conference on the sub-
ject of limitation of armament, in connection with which Pacific
and Far Eastern questions would also be discussed. It would
have been most agreeable to the President to have invited all the
Powers to take part in this Conference, but it was thought to be a
time when other considerations should yield to the practical re-
quirements of the existing exigency, and in this view the invitation
was extended to the group known as the Principal Allied and
Associated Powers, which, by reason of the conditions produced
by the war, control in the main the armament of the world. The
opportunity to limit armament lies within their grasp.

It was recognized, however, that the interests of other Powers
in the Far East made it appropriate that they should be invited to
participate in the discussion of Pacific and Far Eastern problems,
and, with the approval of the five Powers, an invitation to take
part in the discussion of those questions has been extended to
Belgium, China, the Netherlands and Portugal.

The inclusion of the proposal for the discussion of Pacific and
Far Eastern questions was not for the purpose of embarrassing or
delaying an agreement for limitation of armament, but rather to

874 A LEAGUE OF NATIONS

support that undertaking by availing ourselves of this meeting to
endeavor to reach a common understanding as to the principles
and policies to be followed in t*he Far East and thus greatly
diminish, and, if possible, wholly to remove, discernible sources of
controversy. It is believed that by interchanges of views at this
opportune time the Governments represented here may find a
basis of accord and thus give expression to their desire to assure
enduring friendship.

In the public discussions which have preceded the Conference
there have been apparently two competing views; one, that the
consideration of armament should await the result of the discus-
sion of Far Eastern questions, and another, that the latter dis-
cussion should be postponed until an agreement for limitation of
armament has been reached. I am unable to find sufficient reason
for adopting either of these extreme views. I think that it would be
most unfortunate if we should disappoint the hopes which have
attached to this meeting by a postponement of the consideration
of the first subject. The world looks to this Conference to relieve
humanity of the crushing burden created by competition in arma-
ment, and it is the view of the American Government that we
should meet the expectation without any unnecessary delay. It is,
therefore, proposed that the Conference should proceed at once to
consider the question of the limitation of armament.

This, however, does not mean that we must postpone the
examination of Far Eastern questions. These questions of vast
importance press for solution. It is hoped that immediate pro-
vision may be made to deal with them adequately, and it is sug-
gested that it may be found to be entirely practicable through the
distribution of the work among designated committees to make
progress to the ends sought to be achieved without either subject
being treated as a hindrance to the proper consideration and dis-
position of the other.

PREVIOUS EFFORT REVIEWED

The proposal to limit armament by an agreement of the Powers
is not a new one, and we are admonished by the futility of earlier
efforts. It may be well to recall the noble aspirations which were
voiced twenty-three years ago in the imperial rescript of His
Majesty the Emperor of Russia. It was then pointed out

CHECKS CULTURE AND PROGRESS 375

with clarity and emphasis that "the intellectual and physical
strength of the nations, labor and capital are for the major part
diverted from their natural application and unproductively con-
sumed. Hundreds of millions are devoted to acquiring terrible
engines of destruction, which, though to-day regarded as the last
word of science, are destined to-morrow to lose all value in con-
sequence of some fresh discovery in the same field. National cul-
ture, economic progress and the production of wealth are either
paralyzed or checked in their development. Moreover, in pro-
portion as the armaments of each power increase, so do they less
and less fulfill the object which the Governments have set before
themselves. The economic crises, due in great part to the system
of armaments d V entrance and the continual danger which lies in
this massing of war materials, are transforming the armed peace of
our days into a crushing burden, which the peoples have more
and more difficulty in bearing. It appears evident, then, that if
this state of things were prolonged it would inevitably lead to the
calamity which it is desired to avert, and the horrors of which
make every thinking man shudder in advance. To put an end to
these incessant armaments and to seek the means of warding off
the calamities which are threatening the whole world — such is the
supreme duty which is to-day imposed on all states."

It was with this sense of obligation that His Majesty the Em-
peror of Russia proposed the conference, which was "to occupy
itself with this grave problem" and which met at The Hague in
the year 1899. Important as were the deliberations and conclusions
of that conference, especially with respect to the pacific settlement
of international disputes, its result in the specific matter 01 limita-
tion of armament went no further than the adoption of a final
resolution setting forth the opinion "that the restriction ot mili-
tary charges, which are at present a heavy burden on the world, is
extremely desirable for the increase of the material and moral
welfare of mankind," and the utterance of the wish that the Gov-
ernments "may examine the possibility of an agreement as to the
limitation of armed forces by land and sea, and of war budgets."

It was seven years later that the Secretary of State of the
United States, Mr. Elihu Root, in answering a note of the Russian
Ambassador, suggesting in outline a program of the Second Peace
Conference, said : "The Government of the United States, there-

W6 A LEAGUE OF NATIONS

fore, feels it to be its duty to reserve for itself the liberty to propose
to the Second Peace Conference, as one of the subjects for con-
sideration, the reduction or limitation of armaments, in the hope
that, if nothing further can be accomplished, some slight advance
may be made toward the realization of the lofty conception which
actuated the Emperor of Russia in calling the First Conference."
It is significant that the Imperial German Government expressed
itself as "absolutely opposed to the question of disarmament," and
that the Emperor of Germany threatened to decline to send
delegates if the subject of disarmament was to be discussed. In
view, however, of the resolution which had been adopted at the
First Hague Conference, the delegates of the United States were
instructed that the subject of limitation of armament "should be
regarded as unfinished business, and that the Second Conference
should ascertain and give full consideration to the results of such
examination as the Governments may have given to the possibil-
ity of an agreement pursuant to the wish expressed by the First
Conference." But by reason of the obstacles which the subject
had encountered, the Second Peace Conference at The Hague,
although it made notable progress in provision for the peaceful
settlement of controversies, was unable to deal with limitation of
armament except by a resolution in the following general terms:
"The Conference confirms the resolution adopted by the Con-
ference of 1899 in regard to the limitation of military expenditure;
and, inasmuch as military expenditure has considerably increased
in almost every country since that time, the Conference declares
that it is eminently desirable that the Governments should resume
the serious examination of this question."

EXTRAORDINARY OPPORTUNITY PRESENTED

This was the fruition of the efforts of eight years. Although the
effect was clearly perceived, the race in preparation of armament,
wholly unaffected by these futile suggestions, went on until it
fittingly culminated in the greatest war of history; and we are
now suffering from the unparalleled loss of life, the destruction of
hopes, the economic dislocations and the widespread impoverish-
ment which measure the cost of the victory over the brutal
pretensions of military force.

But if we are warned by the inadequacy of earlier endeavors for

VITAL NECESSITY NOW 377

limitation of armament, we can not fail to recognize the extraor-
dinary opportunity now presented. We not only have the lessons
of the past to guide us, not only do we have the reaction from
the disillusioning experience of war, but we must meet the chal-
lenge of imperative economic demands. What was convenient or
highly desirable before is now a matter of vital necessity. If there
is to be economic rehabilitation, if the longings for reasonable
progress are not to be denied, if we are to be spared the uprisings
of peoples made desperate in the desire to shake off burdens no
longer endurable, competition in armament must stop. The
present opportunity not only derives its advantage from a
general appreciation of this fact, but the power to deal with the
exigency now rests with a small group of nations, represented
here, who have every reason to desire peace and to promote
amity. The astounding ambition which lay athwart the promise
of the Second Hague Conference no longer menaces the world,
and the great opportunity of liberty-loving and peace-preserving
democracies has come. Is it not plain that the time has passed
for mere resolutions that the responsible Powers should examine
the question of limitation of armament ? We can no longer content
ourselves with investigations, with statistics, with reports, with
the circumlocution of inquiry. The essential facts are sufficiently
known. The time has come, and this Conference has been called,
not for general resolutions or mutual advice, but for action. We
meet with full understanding that the aspirations of mankind are
not to be defeated either by plausible suggestions of postpone-
ment or by impracticable counsels of perfection. Power and re-
sponsibility are here and the world awaits a practicable -program
which shall at once be put into execution.

I am confident that I shall have your approval in suggesting
that in this matter, as well as in others before the Conference, it is
desirable to follow the course of procedure which has the best
promise of achievement rather than one which would facilitate
division; and thus, constantly aiming to 'agree so far as possible,
we shall, with each point of agreement, make it easier to proceed
to others.

END IT Now Is WAY OUT

The question, in relation to armament, which may be regarded
as of primary importance at this time, and with which we can deal

378 A LEAGUE OF NATIONS

most promptly and effectively, is the limitation of naval arma-
ment. There are certain general considerations which may be
deemed pertinent to this subject.

The first is that the core of the difficulty is to be found in the
competition in naval programs, and that, in order appropriately
to limit naval armament, competition in its production must be
abandoned. Competition will not be remedied by resolves with
respect to the method of its continuance. One program inevitably
leads to another, and ^competition continues, its regulation is
impracticable. There is only one adequate way out and that is to
end it now.

It is apparent that this can not be accomplished without serious
sacrifices. Enormous sums have been expended upon ships under
construction and building programs which are now under way can
not be given up without heavy loss. Yet if the present construc-
tion of capital ships goes forward other ships will inevitably be
built to rival them, and this will lead to still others. Thus the
race will continue so long as ability to continue lasts. The effort to
escape sacrifices is futile. We must face them or yield our purpose.

It is also clear that no one of the naval Powers should be ex-
pected to make these sacrifices alone. The only hope of limitation
of naval armament is by agreement among the nations concerned,
and this agreement should be entirely fair and reasonable in the
extent of the sacrifices required of each of the Powers. In con-
sidering the basis of such an agreement, and the commensurate
sacrifices to be required, it is necessary to have regard to the
existing naval strength of the great navaf Powers, including the
extent of construction already effected in the case of ships in
process. This follows from the fact that one nation is as free to
compete as another, and each may find grounds for its action.
What one may do another may demand the opportunity to rival,
and we remain in the thrall of competitive effort. I may add that
the American delegates are advised by their naval experts that the
tonnage of capital ships may fairly be taken to measure the
relative strength of navies, as the provision for auxiliary com-
batant craft should sustain a reasonable relation to the capital
ship tonnage allowed.

It would also seem to be a vital part of a plan for the limitation
of naval armament that there should be a naval holiday. It is

PROPOSES NAVAL HOLIDAY 379

proposed that for a period of not less than 10 years there should
be no further construction of capital ships.

I am happy to say that I am at liberty to go beyond these
general propositions, and, on behalf of the American Delegation
acting under the instructions of the President of the United States,
to submit to you a concrete proposition for an agreement for the
limitation of naval armament.

It should be added that this proposal immediately concerns the
British Empire, Japan and the United States. In view of the
extraordinary conditions, due to the World War, affecting the
existing strength of the navies of France and Italy, it is not thought
to be necessary to discuss at this stage of the proceedings the ton-
nage allowance of these nations, but the United States proposes
that this matter be reserved for the later consideration of the
Conference.

FOUR PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION

In making the present proposal the United States is most
solicitous to deal with the question upon an entirely reasonable
and practicable basis to the end that the just interests of all shall
be adequately guarded and that national security and defense shall
be maintained. Four general principles have been applied:

(1) That all capital shipbuilding programs, either actual or
projected, should be abandoned;

(2) That further reductions should be made through the
scrapping of certain of the older ships;

(3) That in general regard should be had to the existing naval
strength of the Powers concerned ;

(4) That the. capital ship tonnage should be used as the meas-
urement of strength for navies, and a proportionate allowance of
auxiliary combatant craft prescribed.

The principal features of the proposed agreement are as follows :

United States— CAPITAL SHIPS

The United States is now completing its program of 1916, call-
ing for 10 new battleships and 6 battle cruisers. One battleship
has been completed. The others are in various stages of con-
struction : in some cases from 60 to 80 per cent of the construction
has been done. On these 15 capital ships now being built, over

880 A LEAGUE OF NATIONS

$330,000,000 have been spent. Still, the United States is willing
in the interest of immediate limitation of naval armament to
scrap all these ships.

The United States proposes, if this plan is accepted —

(1) To scrap all capital ships now under construction. This
includes 6 battle cruisers and 7 battleships on the ways and in the
course of building, and 2 battleships launched.

The total number of new capital ships thus to be scrapped is 15.
The total tonnage of the new capital ships when completed would
be 618,000 tons.

(2) To scrap all of the older battleships up to, but not including,
the Delaware and North Dakota. The number of these old battle-
ships to be scrapped is 15. The total tonnage is 227,740 tons.

Thus the number of capital ships to be scrapped by the United
States, if this plan is accepted, is 30, with an aggregate tonnage
(including that of ships in construction, if completed) of 845,740
tons.

Great Britain —

The plan contemplates that Great Britain and Japan shall take
action which is fairly commensurate with this action on the part
of the United States.

It is proposed that Great Britain —

(1) Shall stop further construction of the 4 new Hoods, the
aew capital ships not laid down, but upon which money has been
spent. The 4 ships, if completed, would have a tonnage displace-
ment of 172,000 tons.

(2) Shall, in addition, scrap her predreadnaughts, second line
battleships, and first line battleships, up to, but not including, the
King George V class.

These, with certain predreadnaughts, which it is understood
have already been scrapped, would amount to 19 capital ships
and a tonnage reduction of 411,375 tons.

The total tonnage of ships thus to be scrapped by Great Britain
(including the tonnage of the 4 Hoods, if completed) would be
583,375 tons.

Japan —

It is proposed that Japan —

(1) Shall abandon her program of ships not yet laid down,

JAPAN TO ABANDON PROGRAM 381

viz., the Kii, Owari, No. 7 and No. 8 battleships, and Nos. 5, 6, 7
and 8 battle cruisers.

It should be observed that this does not involve the stopping of
construction, as the construction of none of these ships has been
begun.

(2) Shall scrap 3 capital ships (the Mutsu launched, the Tosa,
and Kago in course of building) and 4 battle cruisers (the Amagi
and Akagi in course of building, and the Atoga and Takao, not yet
laid down, but for which certain material has been assembled).

The total number of new capital ships to be scrapped under this
paragraph is 7. The total tonnage of these new capital ships,
when completed, would be 289,100 tons.

(3) Shall scrap all predreadnaughts and battleships of the
second line. This would include the scrapping of all ships up to
but not including the Settsu; that is, the scrapping of 10 older
ships, with a total tonnage of 159,828 tons.

The total reduction of tonnage on vessels existing, laid down,
or for which material has been assembled (taking the tonnage of
the new ships when completed) would be 448,928 tons.

Thus, under this plan there would be immediately destroyed,
of the navies of the three Powers, 66 capital fighting ships built
and building, but a total tonnage of 1,878,043.

It is proposed that it should be agreed by the United States,
Great Britain and Japan that their navies, with respect to capital
ships, within three months after the making of the agreement,
shall consist of certain ships designated in the proposal and num-
bering for the United States 18, for Great Britain 22, for Japan 10.

The tonnage of these ships would be as follows: Of the United
States, 500,650; of Great Britain, 604,450; of Japan, 299,700. In
reaching this result, the age factor in the case of the respective
navies has reached appropriate consideration.

Replacement —

With respect to replacement, the United States proposes:

(1) That it be agreed that the first replacement tonnage shall
not be laid down until 10 years from the date of the agreement;

(2) That replacement be limited by an agreed maximum of
capital ship tonnage as follows :

382 A LEAGUE OF NATIONS

For the United States 500,000 tons

For Great Britain 500,000 tons

For Japan 300,000 tons

(3) That subject to the 10-year limitation above fixed and the
maximum standard, capital ships may be replaced when they are
20 years old by new capital ship construction;

(4) That no capital ship shall be built in replacement with a
tonnage displacement of more than 35,000 tons.

I have sketched the proposal only in outline, leaving the tech-
nical details to be supplied by the formal proposition which is
ready for submission to the delegates.

The plan includes provision for the limitation of auxiliary
combatant craft. This term embraces three classes, that is (1)
auxiliary surface combatant craft, such as cruisers (exclusive of
battle cruisers), flotilla leaders, destroyers, and various surface
types; (2) submarines, and (3) airplane carriers.

I shall not attempt to review the proposals for these various
classes, as they bear a definite relation to the provisions for capital
fighting ships.

With the acceptance of this plan the burden of meeting the
demands of competition in naval armament will be lifted. Enor-
mous sums will be released to aid the progress of civilization. At
the same time the proper demands of national defense will be
adequately met and the nations will have ample opportunity dur-
ing the naval holiday of 10 years to consider their future course.
Preparation for future naval war will stop now.

I shall not attempt at this time to take up the other topics
which have been listed on the tentative agenda proposed in an-
ticipation of the Conference,

2. PROPOSAL OP THE UNITED STATES FOE A LIMITATION
OF NAVAL ARMAMENT

The United States proposes the following plan for a limitation of the
naval armament of the conferring nations. The United States believes
that this plan safely guards the interests of all concerned.

In working out this proposal the United States has been guided by four
general principles :

(a) The elimination of all capital ship building programs, either
actual or projected.

TO SCRAP OLDER SHIPS 383

(fc) Further reduction through the scrapping of certain of the older
ships.

(c) That regard should be had to the existing naval strength of the
conferring powers.

(d) The use of capital ship tonnage as the measurement of strength
for navies and a proportionate allowance of auxiliary combatant craft
prescribed.

PROPOSAL
"For a limitation of naval armament"

CAPITAL SHIPS

UNITED STATES

1. The United States to scrap all new capital ships now under con-
struction and on their way to completion. This includes 6 battle cruisers
and 7 battleships on the ways and building and 2 battleships launched.

NOTE — (Paragraph 1 involves a reduction of 15 new capita ships under
construction, with a total tonnage when completed of 618,000 tons.
Total amount of money already spent on 15 capital ships, $332,000,000.)

2. The United States to scrap all battleships up to, but not including,
the Delaware and North Dakota.

NOTE — (The number of old battleships scrapped under paragraph 2 is
15; then* total tonnage is 227,740 tons. The grand total of capital ships
to be scrapped is 30, aggregating 845,740 tons.)

GREAT BRITAIN

3. Great Britain to stop further construction of the 4 new Hoods.
NOTE — (Paragraph 3 involves a reduction of 4 new capital ships not

yet laid down, but upon which money has been spent, with a total ton-
nage when completed of 172,000 tons.)

4. In addition to the 4 Hoods, Great Britain to scrap her predread-
naughts, second-line battleships and first-line battleships up to, but not
including, the King George V. class.

NOTE — (Paragraph 4 involves the disposition of 19 capital ships (certain
of which have already been scrapped) with a tonnage reduction of 411,-
375 tons. The grand total tonnage of ships scrapped under this agree-
ment will be 583,375 tons.)

JAPAN

5. Japan to abandon her program of ships not yet laid down, viz. : the
Kii, Owari, No. 7, No. 8, battleships, and Nos. 5, 6, 7 and 8, battle
cruisers.

NOTE — (Paragraph 5 does not involve the stopping of construction on
any ship upon which construction has begun.)

384 A LEAGUE OF NATIONS

6. Japan to scrap 3 battleships: the Mutsu, launched; the Tosa and
Kaga, building; and 4 battle cruisers: the Amagi and Akagi, building, and
the Atago and Takao not yet laid down, but for which certain material
has been assembled.

NOTE — (Paragraph 6 involves a reduction of 7 new capital ships under
construction, with a total tonnage when completed of 288,100 tons.)

7. Japan to scrap all predreadnaughts and capital ships of the second
line. This to include scrapping of all ships up to, but not including, the
Settsu.

NOTE — (Paragraph 7 involves the scrapping of 10 older ships with a
total tonnage of 159,828 tons. The grand total reduction of tonnage on
vessels existing, laid down, or for which material has been assembled, is
448,928 tons.)

FRANCE AND ITALY

8. In view of certain extraordinary conditions due to the World War
affecting the existing strengths of the navies of France and Italy, the
United States does not consider necessary the discussion at this stage of
the proceedings of the tonnage allowance of these nations, but proposes
it be reserved for the later consideration of the Conference.

OTHER NEW CONSTRUCTION

9. No other new capital ships shall be constructed during the period
of this agreement except replacement tonnage as provided hereinafter.

AS NAVIES WOULD STAND

385

10. If the terms of this proposal are agreed to, then the United States,
Great Britain and Japan agree that their navies, three months after the
making of this agreement, shall consist of the following capital ships :

List of Capital Ships

UNITED STATES

GREAT BRITAIN

JAPAN

Maryland

Royal Sovereign

Nagato

California

Royal Oak

Hiuga

Tennessee

Resolution

Ise

Idaho

Ram illies

Yamashiro

Mississippi

Revenge

Fu-So

New Mexico

Queen Elizabeth

Settsu

Arizona

Warspite

Kirishima

Pennsylvania

Valiant

Haruna

Oklahoma

Barham

Hi-Yei

Nevada

Malaya

Kongo

Texas

Benbow

Total, 10

New York

Emperor of India

Total tonnage, 299,700

Arkansas

Iron Duke

Wyoming

Marlborough

Utah

Erin

Florida

King George V

North Dakota

Centurion

Delaware

Ajax

Total, 18

Hood

Total tonnage, 500,650 Renown

Repulse

Tiger

Total, 22

Total tonnage, 604,450

) 0

386 A LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Disposition of Old and New Construction

11. Capital ships shall be disposed of in accordance with methods to
be agreed upon.

Replacements

12. (a) The tonnage basis for capital ship replacement under this
proposal to be as follows :

United States 500,000 tons

Great Britain 500,000 tons

Japan 300,000 tons

(6) Capital ships 20 years from date of completion may be replaced
by new capital ship construction, but the keels of such new construction
shall not be laid until the tonnage which it is to replace is 17 years of age
from date of completion. Provided, however, that the first replacement
tonnage shall not be laid down until 10 years from the date of the signing
of this agreement.

(c) The scrapping of capital ships replaced by new construction shall
be undertaken not later than the date of completion of the new construc-
tion and shall be completed within three months of the date of completion
of new construction; or if the date of completion of new construction be
delayed, then within four years of the laying of the keels of such new
construction.

(d) No capital ships shall be laid down during the term of this agree-
ment, whose tonnage displacement exceeds 35,000 tons.

(e) The same rules for determining tonnage of capital ships shall
apply to the ships of each of the Powers party to this agreement.

(/) Each of the Powers party to this agreement agrees to inform
promptly all of the other Powers party to this agreement concerning :

(1) The names of the capital ships to be replaced by new construction;

(2) The date of authorization of replacement tonnage ;

(3) The dates of laying the keels of replacement tonnage;

(4) The displacement tonnage of each new ship to be laid down;

(5) The actual date of completion of each new ship;

(6) The fact and date of the scrapping of ships replaced.

(g) No fabricated parts of capital ships, including parts of hulls, en-
gines and ordnance, shall be constructed previous to the date of authoriza-
tion of replacement tonnage. A list of such parts will be furnished all
Powers party to this agreement.

(h) In case of the loss or accidental destruction of capital ships, they
may be replaced by new capital ship construction in conformity with the
foregoing rules.

SOME TONNAGE EXEMPT 387

AUXILIARY COMBATANT CRAFT

13. In treating this subject, auxiliary combatant craft have been
divided into three classes :

(a) Auxiliary surface combatant craft.

(6) Submarines.

(c) Airplane carriers and aircraft.

(A) AUXILIARY SURFACE COMBATANT CRAFT

14. The term auxiliary surface combatant craft includes cruisers
(exclusive of battle cruisers), flotilla leaders, destroyers and all other
surface types except those specifically exempted in the following para-
graph.

15. Existing monitors, unarmored surface craft as specified in para-
graph 16, under 8,000 tons; fuel ships, supply ships, tenders, repair ships,
tugs, mine sweepers and vessels readily convertible from merchant ves-
sels are exempt from the terms of this agreement.

16. No new auxiliary combatant craft may be built exempt from this
agreement regarding limitation of naval armament that exceed 3,000
tons displacement and 15 knots speed and carry more than four 5-inch
guns.

17. It is proposed that the total tonnage of cruisers, flotilla leaders
and destroyers allowed each Power shall be as f ollows :

For the United States 450,000 tons

For Great Britain 450,000 tons

For Japan 270,000 tons

Provided, however, that no Power party to this agreement whose total
tonnage in auxiliary surface combatant craft on November 11, 1921,
exceeds the prescribed tonnage shall be required to scrap such excess ton-
nage until replacements begin, at which time the total tonnage of aux-
iliary combatant craft for each nation shall be reduced to the prescribed
allowance as herein stated.

Limitation of New Construction

18. (a) All auxiliary suiface combatant craft whose keels have been
laid down by November 11, 1921, may be carried to completion.

(6) No new construction in auxiliary surface combatant craft except
replacement tonnage as provided hereinafter shall be laid down during
the period of this agreement; provided, however, that such nations as have
not reached the auxiliary surface combatant craft tonnage allowances
hereinbefore stated may construct tonnage up to the limit of their al-
lowance.

388 A LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Scrapping of Old Construction

19. Auxiliary surface combatant craft shall be scrapped in accordance
with methods to be agreed upon.

(B) SUBMARINES

20. It is proposed that the total tonnage of submarines allowed each
Power shall be as follows:

For the United States 90,000 tons

For Great Britain f . 90,000 tons

For Japan 54,000 tons

Provided, however, that no Power party to this agreement whose total
tonnage in submarines on November 11, 1921, exceeds the prescribed ton-
nage shall be required to scrap such excess tonnage until replacements
begin at which time the total tonnage of submarines for each nation
shall be reduced to the prescribed allowance as herein stated.

Limitation of New Construction

21. (a) All submarines whose keels have been laid down by November
11, 1921, may be carried to completion.

(6) No new submarine tonnage except replacement tonnage as pro-
vided hereinafter shall be laid down during the period of this agreement;
provided, however, that such nations as have not reached the submarine
tonnage allowance hereinbefore stated may construct tonnage up to the
limit of their allowance.

Scrapping of Old Construction

22. Submarines shall be scrapped in accordance with methods to be
agreed upon.

(c) AIRPLANE CARRIERS AND AIRCRAFT

23. It is proposed that the total tonnage of airplane carriers allowed
each Power shall be as follows :

United States 80,000 tons

Great Britain 80,000 tons

Japan 48,000 tons

Provided, however, that no Power party to this agreement whose total
tonnage in airplane carriers on November 11, 1921, exceeds the pre-
scribed tonnage shall be required to scrap such excess tonnage until re-
placements begin, at which time the total tonnage of airplane carriers for
each nation shall be reduced to the prescribed allowance as herein stated.

LIFE OF TYPES DETERMINED

389

Limitation of New Construction

AIIU'LA.NE CARRIERS

24. (a) All airplane carriers whose keels have been laid down by
November 11, 1921, may be carried to completion.

(6) No new airplane carrier tonnage except replacement tonnage as
provided herein shall be laid down during the period of this agreement;
provided, however, that such nations as have not reached the airplane
carrier tonnage hereinbefore stated may construct tonnage up to the
limit of their allowance.

Scrapping of Old Construction

25. Airplane carriers shall be scrapped in accordance with methods to
be agreed upon.

AUXILIARY COMBATANT CRAFT
REPLACEMENTS

26. (a) Cruisers 17 years oi age from date of completion may be
replaced by new construction. The keels for such new construction shall
not be laid until the tonnage it is intended to replace is 15 years of age
from date of completion.

(6) Destroyers and flotilla leaders 12 years of age from date of com-
pletion may be replaced by new construction. The keels of such new con-
struction shall not be laid until the tonnage it is intended to replace is 11
years of age from date of completion.

(c) Submarines 12 years of age from date of completion may be re-
placed by new submarine construction, but the keels of such new con-
struction shall not be laid until the tonnage which the new tonnage is to
replace is 11 years of age from date of completion.

(d) Airplane carriers 20 years of age from date of completion may be
replaced by new airplane carrier construction, but the keels of such new
construction shall not be laid until the tonnage which it is to replace is
17 years of age from date of completion.

(e) No surface vessel carrying guns of caliber greater than 8 inches
shall be laid down as replacement tonnage for military combatant surface
craft.

(/) The same rules for determining tonnage of auxiliary combatant
craft shall apply to the ships of each of the Powers party to this agreement.

(g) The scrapping of ships replaced by new construction shall be
undertaken not later than the date of completion of the new construction
and shall be completed within three months of the date of completion of
the new construction, or, if the completion of new tonnage is delayed,
then within 4 years of the laying of the keels of such new construction.

390 A LEAGUE OF NATIONS

(h) Each of the Powers party to this agreement agrees to inform all of
the other Powers party to this agreement concerning:

(1) The names or numbers of the ships to be replaced by new con-
struction;

(2) The date of authorization of replacement tonnage;

(3) The dates of laying the keels of replacement tonnage;

(4) The displacement tonnage of each new ship to be laid down;

(5) The actual date of completion of each new ship;

(6) The fact and date of the scrapping of ships replaced.

(i) No fabricated parts of auxiliary combatant craft, including parts
of hulls, engines, and ordnance, will be constructed previous to the date
of authorization of replacement tonnage. A list of such parts will be fur-
nished- all Powers party to this agreement.

0) In case of the loss or accidental destruction of ships of this class
they may be replaced by new construction in conformity with the fore-
going rules.

AIRCRAFT

27. The limitation of naval aircraft is not proposed.

NOTE — (Owing to the fact that naval aircraft may be readily adapted
from special types of commercial aircraft, it is not considered practicable
to prescribe limits for naval aircraft.)

GENERAL RESTRICTION ON TRANSFER OF COMBATANT VESSELS OF ALL

CLASSES

28. The Powers party to this agreement bind themselves not to dis-
pose of combatant vessels of any class in such a manner that they later
may become combatant vessels in another navy. They bind themselves
further not to acquire combatant vessels from any foreign source.

29. No capital ship tonnage nor auxiliary combatant craft tonnage for
foreign account shall be constructed within the jurisdiction of any one of
the Powers party to this agreement during the term of this agreement.

MERCHANT MARINE

30. As the importance of the merchant marine is in inverse ratio to
the size of naval armaments, regulations must be provided to govern its
conversion features for war purposes.

3. AGREEMENT REACHED BY SUBCOMMITTEE ON NAVAL
ARMAMENT, DECEMBER 15, 1921

The agreement was made public in the following announcement
of the Subcommittee on Naval Armament, which was sent out by
the Associated Press:

STATUS QUO AS TO FORTS 391

The following are the points of agreement that have been
reached in the course of the negotiations between the United
States of America, Great Britain and Japan with respect to their
capital fighting ships.

An agreement has been reached between the three powers —
the United States of America, the British Empire, and Japan — on
the subject of naval ratio. The proposal of the American Govern-
ment that the ratio should be 5-5-3 is accepted.

It is agreed that with respect to fortifications and naval bases
in the Pacific region, including Hong Kong, the status quo shall
be maintained, that is, that there shall be no increase in these
fortifications and naval bases except that this restriction shall not
apply to the Hawaiian Islands, Australia, New Zealand and the
islands composing Japan proper, or, of course, to the coasts of the
United States and Canada, as to which the respective Powers
retain their entire freedom.

The Japanese Government has found special difficulty with
respect to the Mutsu as that is their newest ship. In order to
retain the Mutm Japan has proposed to scrap the Settsu, one of
her older ships, which, under the American proposal, was to have
been retained. This would leave the number of Japan's capital
ships the same, that is, 10, as under the American proposal. The
retention of the Mutsu by Japan in place of the Settsu makes a
difference in net tonnage of 13,600 tons, making the total tonnage
of Japan's capital ships 313,300 tons, as against 299,700 tons under
the original American proposal.

While the difference in tonnage is small, there would be con
siderable difference in efficiency, as the retention of the Mutsu
would give to Japan two post-Jutland ships of the latest design.

In order to meet this situation and to preserve the relative
strength on the basis of the agreed ratio, it is agreed that the
United States shall complete two of the ships in course of con-
struction, that is, the Colorado and the Washington, which are
now about 90 per cent completed, and scrap two of the older ships,
that is, the North Dakota and the Delaware, which under the
original proposal were to be retained. This would leave the
United States with the same number of capital ships, that is, 18
as under the original proposal, with a tonnage of 525,850 tons, as

392 A LEAGUE OF NATIONS

against 500,650 tons as originally proposed. Three of the ships
would be post-Jutland ships of the Maryland type.

As the British have no post-Jutland ships, except one Hood, the
construction of which is only partly post-Jutland, it is agreed that
in order to maintain proper relative strength the British Govern-
ment may construct two new ships, not to exceed 35,000 legend
tons each, that is, calculating the tonnage according to British
standards of measurement, or according to American calculations,
the equivalent of 37,000 tons each.

It is agreed that the British Government shall, on the com-
pletion of these two new ships, scrap four of their ships of the King
George V type, that is, the Erin, King George V9 Centurion and
Ajax, which were to have been retained under the original Ameri-
can proposal. This would leave the British capital ships in num-
ber 20, as against 22 under the American proposal.

Taking the tonnage of the two new ships according to American
calculation, it would amount to 74,000 and the 4 ships scrapped
having a tonnage of 96,400 tons, leaving the British tonnage of
capital ships 582,050, instead of 604,450. This would give the
British as against the United States an excess tonnage of 66,200
tons, which is deemed to be fair, in view of the age of the ships of
the Royal Sovereign and the Queen Elizabeth types.

The maximum limitation for the tonnage of ships to be con-
structed in replacement is to be fixed at 35,000 legend tons, that
is, according to British standards of measurement, or according to
American calculations, the equivalent of 37,000 tons.

In order to give accommodations to these changes, the maxi-
mum tonnage of capital ships is fixed, for the purpose of replace-
ment, on the basis of American standards of calculation, as
follows:

United States, 525,000 tons;

Great Britain, 525,000 tons;

Japan, 315,000 tons.

Comparing this arrangement with the original American pro-
posal, it will be observed that the United States is to scrap 30
ships, as proposed, save that there will be scrapped 13 of the 15
ships under construction, and 17 instead of 15 of the older ships.

The total tonnage of the American capital ships to be scrapped
under the original proposal, including the tonnage of ships iu

TO SCRAP 66 CAPITAL SHIPS 393

construction, if completed, was stated to be 845,740 tons. Under
the present arrangement, the tonnage of the 30 ships to be
scrapped, taking that of the ships in construction if completed,
would be 820,540 tons.

The number of the Japanese ships to be retained remains the
same as under the original proposal. The total tonnage of the ships
to be scrapped by Japan under the original American proposal,
taking the tonnage of new ships when completed, was stated to be
448,923 tons. The total tonnage of the ships to be scrapped under
the present arrangement is 435,328 tons.

Under the original proposal Great Britain was to scrap 19 capital
ships (including certain predreadnaughts already scrapped);
whereas under the present arrangement she will scrap four more,
or a total of 23. The total tonnage of ships to be scrapped by
Great Britain, including the tonnage of the four Hoods, to which
the proposal referred as laid down, if completed, was stated to be
583,375 tons. The corresponding total of scrapped ships under
the new arrangement will be 22,600 tons more, or 605,975 tons.

Under the American proposal there were to be scrapped 66
capital fighting ships built and building, with a total tonnage
(taking ships laid down as completed) of 1,878,043 tons. Under
the present arrangement, on the same basis of calculation, there
are to be scrapped 68 capital fighting ships, with a tonnage of
1,861,643 tons.

The naval holiday of 10 years with respect to capital ships, as
originally proposed by the American Government, is to be main-
tained except for the permission to construct ships as above
stated.

This arrangement between the United States, Great Britain and
Japan is, so far as the number of ships to be retained and scrapped
is concerned, dependent upon a suitable agreement with France
and Italy as to their capital ships, a matter which is now in course
of negotiation.

14 DAY USE

RETURN TO DESK FROM WHICH BORROWED

LOAN DEPT.

This book is due on the last date stamped below, or

on the date to which renewed.
Renewed books are subject to immediate recall.

fiPR29

1968

m? ^

Uj

JAN 1 7 2007

APR a 01970 7 £

GENERAL LIBRARY U.C. BERKELEY

THE UNIVERSITY OF CAUFORNIA LIBRARY